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Insecure Communities: Examining Local 
Government Participation in US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement’s “Secure Communities” 
Program 
Rachel R. Ray 
In the last several years, suffering global economies, war, ethnic and 
racial tensions, natural disasters, and other exigencies have led to a steady 
stream of immigrants to the United States. They seek jobs, refuge, asylum, 
and better opportunities. In fiscal year 2010, the United States Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) removed a record-setting 392,000 
undocumented immigrants, half of which were convicted criminals.1 Yet a 
careful look behind this impressive number would undoubtedly reveal 
families torn apart by the removal of undocumented spouses, parents, 
siblings, and children convicted only of nonviolent crimes, traffic 
violations, or other minor infractions.2 ICE’s own data shows that 79 
                                                             
 
 J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law, rrray@ucdavis.edu. This piece is 
dedicated to beloved Professor Keith Aoki, without whom I would never have written 
this article. May his legacy continue in those whom he inspired to go beyond their self-
imposed limits. Many thanks to Dean Kevin Johnson, Professor Bill Ong Hing, Professor 
Lisa Pruitt, Errol Dauis, Julien Capers, William McKenna, and Lov Goel for their 
invaluable guidance. 
1 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces Record-
Breaking Immigration Enforcement Statistics Achieved under the Obama Administration 
(Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1286389936778.shtm. 
2 See, e.g., NDLON, Petition to Secretary Napolitano, 
http://action.altoarizona.com/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=4383 (last visited Nov. 
18, 2010) (describing a petition sponsored by multiple community organizations 
opposing S-Comm) (“[recent statistics touted by DHS confirm that a historic record 
number of families have been torn apart under the Obama Administration’s management 
of DHS.”). ICE has also mistakenly attempted to deport citizens. See, e.g., Lornet 
Turnbull, Citizen Wrongly Held as Illegal Immigrant Gets $400,000, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Feb.  24, 2011),  
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percent of people deported through its “Secure Communities” (S-Comm) 
program are noncriminals or were detained for lower-level offenses, such as 
traffic violations.3 S-Comm is just one of many initiatives designed to 
identify and deport undocumented people, specifically those convicted of 
crimes. Try as it might, the US government has not yet found a successful 
way to deter illegal immigration, nor has it developed satisfactory 
immigration reform. 
This article considers ICE’s S-Comm program, options for local law 
enforcement agencies and local governments to resist complying with it, 
and ways to implement the program less stringently in cases involving 
noncriminal, undocumented immigrants. Further, this article explores the 
potential and actual problems that arise with S-Comm, as well as the legal 
framework for local enforcement of federal immigration laws. Next, this 
article includes specific examples of immigration enforcement and 
noncompliance in several counties in California, including Los Angeles, 
Santa Clara, and San Francisco. Finally, this article suggests improvements 
that the federal government should make to S-Comm to ensure that the 
program is just and constitutional. S-Comm has been flawed since its 




3 See ACLU Statement on Secure Communities, AM. C.L. UNION (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-statement-secure-communities (describing 
the dangers associated with S-Comm) (“Because it targets people at the time of arrest, S-
Comm captures people who will never be charged with a state crime—including crime 
victims, witnesses, and individuals subjected to unconstitutional arrests.”) [hereinafter 
ACLU Statement]. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, immigration enforcement in the United States has primarily 
been the task of the federal government. Criminal law enforcement, on the 
other hand, has been state governments’ responsibility.4 Immigration and 
criminal law were intended to remain distinct areas of enforcement. Though 
this division of enforcement remained intact for many years, it is changing 
in part because grounds for deportation or inadmissibility as an immigrant 
arise from violations of criminal laws.5 Since the mid-1990s, state and local 
governments have become much more engaged in immigration 
enforcement. State and local law enforcement cooperation with immigration 
authorities, 287(g) agreements,6 and legislation such as Arizona Senate Bill 
1070 (SB 1070)7 break down the traditional division between immigration 
enforcement and criminal law enforcement.8 The US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) “Secure Communities” program (S-Comm) 
is part of the breakdown of this division of enforcement. 
This article examines S-Comm and its effects on local law enforcement 
agencies (LLEAs), local governments, and immigrant communities, and 
calls for changes to the program that should be made if it is to be 
                                                             
 
4 For more information about the intersection between criminal and immigration law, 
see Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 379 (2006) (discussing the roots of and motivation behind the 
merger of the two fields of law); see also Jennifer M. Chacon, Managing Migration 
Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (Dec. 2009) (describing the trend of 
criminal prosecutions of migration-related offenses and the decreasing protections related 
to such prosecutions). 
5 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2010). 
6 Congress passed Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 
1357(g)) in 1995, enabling state and local law enforcement agencies to enter into 
agreements with the federal government so that they may enforce immigration laws. See 
infra p. 364.  
7 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (as modified by H.B. 2162, 49th 
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 30, 2010)) (“SB 1070”); A.R.S. § 11-1051(B). 
8 See supra note 4; infra Part IV. 
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implemented nationwide. Part II describes the steps involved in the S-
Comm information-sharing process. Part III discusses S-Comm’s potential 
and actual effects on public safety, family unity, and civil rights. Part IV 
examines the question of whether S-Comm exceeds the federal 
government’s powers. Part V looks at “sanctuary cities” and other methods 
of resistance to S-Comm. This article concludes with suggestions for 
effectively reforming S-Comm by giving examples of the implementation 
of these reforms with the intention of remedying the detrimental impact of 
the program on immigrants and their communities. The federal government 
should allow local governments to opt out of S-Comm, and the government 
agencies responsible for the program and its oversight must ensure that 
federal, state, and local government employees implement recently 
proposed changes to the program. 
II. THE SECURE COMMUNITIES INFORMATION-SHARING PROCESS 
ICE introduced S-Comm9 in March 2008, referring to it as a 
“comprehensive strategy to improve and modernize the identification and 
removal of criminal aliens from the United States.”10 Since its activation in 
October 2008, S-Comm has helped ICE identify and deport more than 
                                                             
 
9 I refer to “Secure Communities” as S-Comm throughout this article because I believe 
its actual effect on communities is to make them less “secure” by chilling crime reporting 
and negatively impacting domestic violence victims. See, e.g., Marie C. Baca, 
Immigration Initiative May Put Domestic Violence Victims at Risk, CALIFORNIA WATCH 
(Mar. 3, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/immigration-initiative-may-put-
domestic-violence-victims-risk-8993; Renee Feltz & Stokely Baksh, Immigration 
Crackdown Creates Insecure Communities, PUB. BROAD. SERV. (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/security/video-immigration-crackdown-creates-
insecure-communities/2964/. 
10 Press Release, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf., Desoto County to Benefit from ICE 
Strategy to Enhance the Identification, Removal of Criminal Aliens Uses Biometrics to 
Prioritize Immigration Enforcement Actions Against Convicted Criminal Aliens (Oct. 1, 
2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1010/101001desoto.htm. 
[hereinafter Desoto County News Release]. 
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86,616 undocumented immigrants convicted of crimes.11 This number 
includes more than 12,200 “criminal aliens” convicted of serious crimes and 
over 29,500 “criminal aliens”12 convicted of less serious crimes.13 
According to ICE, “criminal aliens” are undocumented immigrants 
convicted of a crime.14 Undocumented immigrants who are charged with 
crimes, but not yet convicted, are not considered to be “criminal aliens.”15 
ICE classifies undocumented immigrants convicted of a criminal offense 
into three categories. Level 1 crimes present the greatest threat and include 
murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, major drug offenses, and national 
security crimes.16 Level 2 crimes present the second greatest threat and 
include minor property and drug offenses, such as larceny, fraud, burglary, 
and money laundering. Level 3 crimes include all “other offenses.”17 Level 
2 and 3 crimes “account for the majority of crimes committed by aliens.”18 
Though ICE hopes to implement S-Comm nationwide by 2013, the 
agency is focusing first on “criminal aliens in locations where analysis 
determines they are most likely to reside.”19 As of June 30, 2011, S-Comm 
                                                             
 
11 U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF., NATIONWIDE ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS (Jun. 30, 
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf 
[hereinafter NATIONWIDE ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS]. 
12 “Criminal aliens” is the term ICE uses to describe undocumented immigrants convicted 
of crimes.  I use this ICE term strictly as a term of art. 
13 Desoto County News Release, supra note 10. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.& CUSTOMS ENF. & [STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU] 
TEMPLATE, available at  
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesmoatemplate.pdf 
[hereinafter ICE-SIB AGREEMENT]. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Secure Communities Deployment, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF., 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/deployment/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010), text 
available at D.A. King, Coming Soon to Many Georgia Communities; DHS/ICE Secure 
Communities Program, DUSTIN INMAN SOC’Y BLOG (Jan. 18, 2010, 2:39 PM), 
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was in place in 1,508 of 3,181 jurisdictions in forty-four states and 
territories.20 For example, only 1 percent of jurisdictions in Kentucky, 4 
percent of jurisdictions in both Pennsylvania and Wyoming, and 5 percent 
of jurisdictions in Montana had been activated as of June 30, 2011.21 No 
jurisdictions in Alaska, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, District of Columbia, or Vermont had been activated as of 
that same date. By contrast, 100 percent of jurisdictions in Arizona, 
California, Delaware, Florida, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode 
Island, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin had been activated as 
of June 30, 2011.22 
S-Comm was intended to increase public safety by prioritizing the 
identification and removal of undocumented immigrants with criminal 
convictions. S-Comm seeks to achieve this goal by enlisting LLEAs to 
submit arrestees’ fingerprints to the State Identification Bureau (SIB) at the 
time of each booking.23 ICE requests that LLEAs submit fingerprints 
electronically to the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(IAFIS) as soon as possible during the booking process.24 
                                                                                                                                 
 
http://thedustininmansociety.org/blog/?p=2910. Some of the problems that arose since 
DHS enacted S-Comm may be a consequence of its initial piecemeal implementation of 
the program. Had ICE rolled out the program nationally at one time, perhaps the highly 
problematic inconsistencies that counties are grappling with today could have been 
avoided. 
20 NATIONWIDE ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 11. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF., SECURE COMMUNITIES STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURES § 2.1 at 3 (Sep. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf 
[hereinafter SOP]. 
24 Id. § 3.1.1, at 7. IAFIS, the “largest biometric database in the world,” is a national 
system available twenty-four hours a day to help solve and prevent crime through 
fingerprint searches, criminal history, alias, and image databases, and electronic exchange 
of fingerprints. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF 
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The SIB then transmits the fingerprints electronically to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services 
Division (CJIS).25 State participants in the National Fingerprint File 
Program send fingerprints to CJIS at the time of the individual’s initial 
arrest.26 CJIS’s receipt of the ten fingerprints initiates both IAFIS and 
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) searches.27 If 
an IDENT search matches a fingerprint, CJIS automatically sends an 
Immigration Alien Query to the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center 
(LESC) in order to verify the individual’s criminal history and immigration 
status.28 LESC then creates and sends an Immigration Alien Response 
(IAR) to CJIS and the local ICE Detention and Removal Operations Office 
(DRO) within four hours of fingerprint submission to IAFIS and IDENT.29 
This entire process takes place before charges have been filed against the 
immigrant. 
After receiving the IAR from the LESC, ICE determines whether to issue 
a detainer. ICE will file an immigration detainer if the noncitizen in 
question is charged with a Level 1 offense or if he or she has a Level 1 
conviction that could result in removal. ICE files these detainers with the 
LLEA with custody of the individual at the time of booking.30 Although 
ICE claims that S-Comm “prioritizes enforcement action toward the 
greatest threats to public safety” through the removal of “criminal aliens” 
convicted of crimes such as homicide, kidnapping, rape, and threatening 
                                                                                                                                 
 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
25 SOP, supra note 23, § 2.1, at 3. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. § 2.1.1, at 4. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. § 3.1.6, at 7. 
30 Id. § 2.1.5, at 5.  
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national security (Level 1 offenders), the program permits ICE discretion 
regarding processing of Level 2 and 3 offenders.31 
Under S-Comm, only ICE determines the individual’s “alienage” and 
removability after a detainer is issued. ICE makes that determination based 
on an interview it conducts in person or via telephone or video 
teleconference;32 however, an ICE field office will issue detainers, as 
deemed “appropriate,” with the LLEA.33 If an LLEA releases an 
undocumented immigrant before ICE issues a detainer, ICE may request 
information about the individual’s location and identification from the 
LLEA.34 Pursuant to the immigration detainer, ICE should assume custody 
of the undocumented immigrant within forty-eight hours (not counting 
Saturdays, Sundays, or federal holidays) of notification of an immigrant’s 
release. After taking undocumented immigrants convicted of serious 
criminal offenses into custody, ICE will take “immediate action” to remove 
them.35 
According to ICE, “[t]he biometric information sharing capability 
[involved in S-Comm] takes place at a federal level and happens 
automatically when a subject’s fingerprints are submitted upon booking. 
This automatic process requires no change to law enforcement’s daily 
                                                             
 
31 Id. § 1.0, at 3. 
32 Id. § 3.2.1., at 8. 
33 Id. § 3.1.7, at 8. 
34 Id. § 2.1.5, at 5. 
35 Id. § 3.2.4, at 8. “Normally, ICE will not remove an alien until pending criminal 
charges are adjudicated. If ICE wishes to remove an alien whose charges have not been 
adjudicated, ICE will make all efforts to inform the local LEA, the prosecutor and the 
court with jurisdiction over the criminal offense on the status of the subject’s removal 
proceedings.” Id. § 3.2.5. 
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operations.”36 Further, ICE’s former37 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/ICE and SIBs states: 
This MOA does not affect a state’s existing relationship with the 
FBI CJIS Division. Rather, the MOA builds on and enhances that 
relationship. Neither the SIB nor any state or local LEA that is 
subject to this MOA will be responsible for determining an 
individual’s immigration status or whether a particular conviction 
renders an individual removable pursuant to the INA.38 
Despite the MOA and a recent directive issued by ICE Director John 
Morton, ICE requests that LLEAs abide by conditions stated in the 
immigration detainer.39 LLEAs must not detain an undocumented 
immigrant for a period exceeding forty-eight hours. They must inform ICE 
if the subject is transferred or released, file the detainer in the subject’s 
record or file, allow ICE officers and agents access to detainees, assist ICE 
in acquiring booking and/or detention information about detainees, comply 
with CJIS and US-VISIT rules, and include S-Comm in community 
policing and other outreach activities.40 In fact, in order to take part in S-
Comm and provide DHS with fingerprint data, LLEAs must make changes 
to their current technology or install new fingerprinting equipment.41 
                                                             
 
36 US IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF., BENEFITTING LAW ENFORCEMENT THROUGHOUT THE 
UNITED STATES (2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/lea-benefits.pdf. 
37 As of August 2011, ICE will terminate all existing S-Comm MOAs.  See infra p. 372.  
38 ICE-SIB AGREEMENT, supra note 15. 
39 Letter from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf. (Aug. 5, 2011), 
available at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/27924754/Sec-Comm%20govlet%208-5-11.pdf. 
40 Id.; SOP, supra note 23, § 2.2.1–8, at 6. 
41 Kirk Semple, Confusion Over Program to Spot Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 2010, at A26. 
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III. A NATION OF “SECURE” COMMUNITIES: S-COMM’S EFFECTS 
When S-Comm began in 2008, ICE implemented the program in just 
fourteen LLEA jurisdictions. As of June 30, 2011, forty-seven percent of 
jurisdictions had applied the program, and DHS is on track to expand the 
program to all LLEAs across the country by 2013.42 Fiscal year (FY) 2010 
statistics show a 70 percent increase in removal of “criminal aliens” 
compared to FY 2008.43 In 2010, S-Comm’s implementation resulted in the 
arrest of 21,000 Level 1 offenders and more than 59,000 “convicted 
criminal aliens” total.44 However, ICE’s own data suggests that many 
detainers issued through S-Comm were placed against noncriminal 
individuals or those convicted of Level 2 or 3 crimes.45 This action is not 
only in opposition to the program’s purpose, but it is also unfair. 
S-Comm has been widely criticized across the country by politicians, 
attorneys, law enforcement officials, and by advocates of immigrant rights, 
human rights, and domestic violence victims.46 Some immigrant rights 
advocates analogize S-Comm to a nationwide version of Arizona’s SB 
1070;47 S-Comm puts benign offenders—for example, those who miss a 
                                                             
 
42 NATIONWIDE ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 11. 
43 Id. 
44 Secure Communities Deployment, supra note 19. 
45 See US IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF., SECURE COMMUNITIES: IDENT/IAFIS 
INTEROPERABILITY, MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH APRIL 30, 2011 (May 23, 2011), 
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interoperability_stats-
fy2011-feb28.pdf.  
46 See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, PROJECT VOICE NEW ENGLAND, ET 
AL., RESTORING COMMUNITY: A NATIONAL COMMUNITY ADVISORY REPORT ON ICE’S 
FAILED “SECURE COMMUNITIES” PROGRAM (Aug. 2011), available at 
http://altopolimigra.com/documents/FINAL-Shadow-Report-regular-print.pdf. 
47 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); see, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin et al., 
Arizona Senate Bill 1070: A Preliminary Report on Legal Issues Raised by Arizona’s 
New Statute Regulating Immigration, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 35 (2010) (pinpointing 
the central legal issues raised by Arizona S.B. 1070); see, e.g., Mary McThomas, 
Federalism, States’ Rights and Immigration Policy (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n Working 
Paper 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641907. 
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stop sign—at risk for deportation. Additionally, it implicitly encourages 
racial profiling while breaking down trust between immigrant communities 
and LLEAs. 
To determine if S-Comm in its current iteration carries out its stated goal, 
it is necessary to examine the program’s implementation. In February 2010, 
the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), the National Day Laborer 
Organizing Network (NDLON), and the Benjamin Cardozo Immigration 
Justice Clinic filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for ICE 
documents concerning S-Comm.48 In April 2010, the three groups filed a 
lawsuit in the Southern District of New York “due to the urgent public need 
for the requested records.”49 ICE responded by releasing important records, 
including cumulative data about S-Comm. Information released in response 
to CCR, NDLON, and Cardozo’s FOIA request revealed that 79 percent of 
those deported under S-Comm had no criminal record or had been arrested 
or detained for low-level offenses.50 As of June 30, 2010, 32 percent of 
individuals given over to ICE custody via S-Comm were noncriminals—up 
from 22 percent in FY 200951—and 26 percent of S-Comm deportees also 
had no criminal records.52 However, this number varied greatly by county 
and by state. For example, 82 percent of individuals in Travis County, 
Texas, and 54 percent of individuals deported through S-Comm in 
                                                             
 
48 Ctr. for Const. Rights et al., Briefing Guide to “Secure Communities”—ICE’s 
Controversial Immigration Enforcement Program New Statistics and Information Reveal 
Disturbing Trends and Leave Crucial Questions Unanswered (Aug. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw-
741/NDLON_FOIA_Briefing%20guide.final.pdf [hereinafter CCR Briefing Guide]. 
49 National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) v. US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement Agency (ICE), CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/secure-
communities (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). 
50 CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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Maricopa County, Arizona, had no criminal records.53 ICE’s own data 
indicates that ICE and LLEAs are not implementing S-Comm uniformly, 
nor as it was intended. 
Detention and deportation of noncriminal, undocumented immigrants are 
just two of the risks posed by S-Comm. On June 17, 2011, ICE attempted to 
address concerns raised by immigrant and domestic violence victim 
activists.54 ICE now encourages ICE officers, attorneys, and special agents 
to exercise their prosecutorial discretion and refrain from asserting the “full 
scope” of their authority to enforce immigration policy when appropriate.55  
In particular, ICE encourages favorably exercising prosecutorial discretion 
toward survivors of domestic violence or other serious crimes, as well as 
witnesses and plaintiffs in litigation regarding violations of civil rights or 
liberties.56 However, these changes to S-Comm’s implementation may 
prove to be inadequate. According to Thomas A. Saenz, Mexican American 
Legal Defense and Education Fund president and general counsel, ICE’s 
reforms “amount to little more than lipstick on a pig, except that this is a 
snarling, vicious, and rabid pig that will continue to run rampant and inflict 
serious damage on families and communities across the nation.”57 Further, 
                                                             
 
53 Id. Maricopa County’s high number may have been a result of the county’s sheriff, 
who “is notorious for staging indiscriminate immigration raids.” Editorial, Immigration 
Bait and Switch, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A22. 
54 See Memorandum Regarding Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, 
and Plaintiffs, from John Morton, Dir., US Immigr. & Customs Enf., to all Field Office 
Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel (June 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf [hereinafter 
Morton I]; see also Memorandum Regarding Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 
Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, John Morton, Dir., US IMMIGR. & 
CUSTOMS ENF. (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [hereinafter Morton II]. 
55 See Morton II, supra note 54. 
56 Id. 
57 MALDEF Response to Secure Communities Program Changes, MALDEF, 
http://www.maldef.org/news/releases/secure_communities_program_changes_response/. 
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the reform is likely premature because it was announced before ICE and the 
inspector general adequately reviewed the program. California 
Assemblymember Tom Ammiano proposes that ICE should suspend S-
Comm and wait for the inspector general report so that they may develop 
better policies.58 Described below are a number of other concerns, as well as 
comments on ICE’s efforts to address such concerns. 
A. Reduction in the Reporting of Crimes 
S-Comm is a “source of anxiety”59 for LLEAs, cities, and counties 
wanting to maintain a clear distinction between federal immigration 
enforcement and local law enforcement. Because S-Comm has only recently 
been deployed on a large scale, it remains unclear what the impact on local 
law enforcement practices will be. Negative impact in communities with 
large immigrant populations is of particular concern. 
If immigrant communities view local law enforcement officers as 
enforcers of immigration law, LLEAs may lose the confidence of 
immigrants.60 Law enforcement agencies rely on this confidence in order to 
receive compliance with the law and during criminal proceedings.61 
According to Charlie Beck, Los Angeles chief of police, “[S-Comm causes] 
a divide where there’s a lack of trust, a lack of reporting, a lack of 
                                                             
 
58 Press Release, Tom Ammiano, Assemblymember, Cal. State Assembly, “Cosmetic 
‘Reforms’ to S-Comm More Spin than Substance” (June 17, 2011), available at 
http://asmdc.org/members/a13/news-room/press-releases/item/2935-cosmetic-reforms-to-
s-comm-more-spin-than-substance [hereinafter Cosmetic Reforms]. 
59 Semple, supra note 41, at A30. For an illustration of local law enforcement’s anti-
immigration stance in the rural South, see Lisa R. Pruitt, Latina/os, Locality, and Law in 
the Rural South, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 135, 159 (2009). 
60 Interview with Kevin Johnson, Dean, UC Davis Sch. of Law, in Davis, CA (Oct. 13, 
2010) [hereinafter Dean Johnson Interview]. 
61 Id. 
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cooperation with police.”62 If LLEAs expand their duties to include 
immigration matters, undocumented immigrants will likely feel 
uncomfortable reporting crime, “thus encouraging criminals to further 
victimize [immigrant] communities and spread into the community at 
large.”63 Criminals may target undocumented immigrants if they know that 
as victims, those immigrants and their communities are unlikely to 
cooperate with police who are known to be involved in reporting 
undocumented immigrants to immigration officials.64 Further, immigrant 
communities are closely knit. Once information circulates that arrest, even 
without conviction, can lead to deportation, there may be a rise in resistance 
to or evasion of arrest and an imposition of “new layers of fear and 
isolation” on immigrants.65 Unfortunately, ICE’s June 2011 changes do not 
specifically address this concern, possibly because DHS and ICE take the 
position that “it remains the responsibility of each jurisdiction to abide by 
its constitutional obligation to avoid discriminatory policing.”66 
                                                             
 
62 Leslie Berenstein Rojas, LAPD Chief on Secure Communities: “It Tends to Cause a 
Divide,” MULTI-AMERICAN (June 3, 2011), http://multiamerican.scpr.org/2011/06/lapd-
chief-on-secure-communities-it-tends-to-cause-a-divide/ (quoting an interview by Patt 
Morrison with Charlie Beck, Chief, L.A. Police Dep’t, in Los Angeles, Cal. (June 2, 
2011), available at http://www.scpr.org/programs/patt-morrison/2011/06/02/19343/ask-
the-chief-update-with-lapds-top-cop-charlie-be). 
63 Gail Pendleton, Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws and its Effects on 
Victims of Domestic Violence, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
(2010), available at 
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legal_archives/Archive_Local%20Enforceme
nt%20and%20Domestic%20Violence-1.doc. 
64 Anne B. Chandler, Why is the Policeman Asking for My Visa? The Future of 
Federalism and Immigration Enforcement, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 209, 233 
(2008). 
65 Id. See also Editorial, supra note 53. 
66 Memorandum from Margo Schlanger, Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec. & Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., US Immigr. & Customs Enf., To all 
ICE and CRCL Personnel (June 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/complaintprotocol.pdf. 
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B. Explicit or Implicit Racism 
According to ICE, S-Comm reduces ethnic and racial profiling.67 
However, data obtained via the CCR/NDLON/Cardozo FOIA request 
suggests that S-Comm actually contributes to and conceals racial 
profiling.68 S-Comm enables willing state and local law enforcement 
officials to stop and arrest individuals based upon their appearance. Those 
suspected to be undocumented can be arrested and deported.69 Because S-
Comm sends fingerprints to ICE at the booking stage, rather than at the 
charging or conviction stage, ICE is notified almost instantaneously after a 
law enforcement official arrests an undocumented immigrant. This facet of 
the program may encourage LLEAs to arrest individuals they deem 
“foreign-looking” in order to send their fingerprints to ICE.70 Aware of this 
possibility, ICE uploaded a briefing to YouTube on June 20, 2011 that 
includes a warning to LLEAs that decisions to arrest or book should not be 
                                                             
 
67 CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48.  
68 CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48. See also Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling 
in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. 
United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1076 
(April 2010) (discussing the long-standing use of racial profiling by law enforcement and 
two Supreme Court cases that, in effect, permit such profiling) (“Unfortunately, the 
events of September 11, 2001, noticeably slowed the movement to end racial profiling. 
To the contrary, the US government relied heavily on racial, national origin, and religious 
profiles in the newly proclaimed ‘war on terror.’ The comeback of racial profiling and its 
subsequent retrenchment reveals the difficulties of racial minorities relying on the 
political process in pursuit of social justice and suggests the need for different minority 
groups to work together politically in order to eliminate racial profiling.”). 
69 CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48. 
70 See, e.g., ACLU Statement, supra note 3; see also Bill Ong Hing, Understanding 
SB1070 From the Lens of Institutionalized Racism and Civil Rights, RACE EQ. PROJECT 
E-NEWSL. (Legal Servs. of N. Cal., Inc., Sacramento, Cal.), Sept. 30, 2010, 
http://www.equity.lsnc.net/understanding-sb1070-from-the-lens-of-institutionalized-
racism-and-civil-rights/; Jason G. Idilbi, Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law: 
Should North Carolina Communities Implement 287(g) Authority?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
1710, 1725–28 (2008). 
Insecure Communities 343 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2011 
based on perceptions of race, ethnicity, or ability to speak English.71 Any 
decline in the amount of racial profiling related to S-Comm has not yet been 
documented. 
Though law enforcement officers’ motivations may not be entirely clear, 
the following story illustrates the possibility that officers may stop 
individuals based on appearance. Felipe, a twenty-nine-year-old Mexican 
national who has lived in the United States since he was four years old, has 
no ability to become a US citizen unless he marries a US citizen.72 One 
afternoon in early 2010, two police officers pulled him over while he was 
driving home from work in Santa Barbara, California. Felipe was not 
speeding. When he asked the officers why he had been stopped, they did not 
answer his question. 
After asking for Felipe’s license and registration, the officers learned that 
the car was insured and that Felipe did not have a state-issued driver’s 
license, which is not a statutorily deportable offense. He had with him a 
Mexican driver’s license and a passport. Stating that both the license and 
passport were clearly fakes, the officers arrested Felipe for felony 
possession of fraudulent documents. Felipe asked the officers if he could 
call someone to get another form of identification, but they refused to let 
him. The officers also said that they had received a report of a car like 
Felipe’s in a nearby city and suspected him of transporting drugs in his car. 
Felipe consented to a search, and the officers found nothing. Felipe was 
taken to the county jail where, during the booking process, officers asked 
                                                             
 
71 ICE Secure Communities, Secure Communities Briefing #1: What Law Enforcement 
Needs to Know, YOUTUBE (June 20, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUdeqg5TpHA&feature=youtube [hereinafter Briefing 
#1]. 
72 Interview with anonymous immigration advocate in Davis, CA.  This interview was 
conducted under a mutual agreement of confidentiality to protect both the advocate and 
“Felipe.” (Feb. 22, 2011) (names and other details have been changed in order to protect 
anonymity). 
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him about his immigration status. When he refused to answer, the officers 
said they had already fingerprinted him and there was no record of his 
immigration, so they “knew” he was undocumented. 
The officers told Felipe that they were going to detain him until the next 
day, when ICE would pick him up. They said they had placed an ICE hold 
on him, so it would be best if he simply disclosed his status to the police 
because ICE was going to deport him regardless. Fortunately for Felipe, he 
had attended community education seminars for immigrants and understood 
some of what the police were telling him. Felipe is also a fluent English 
speaker, whereas many immigrants who are detained by police do not speak 
English and are not assisted by a translator. While he was interrogated and 
detained, Felipe felt like the officers were making fun of him. It was not 
clear what they planned to do with Felipe; they said things to each other 
like, “make it the maximum; he’s not getting out anyway.” 
When Felipe’s mother called the jail and asked for his charges, the officer 
said he could not disclose them because of Felipe’s ICE hold. As a result, 
Felipe’s mother could not post bail. Felipe’s cousin learned of his arrest and 
immediately drove to the jail, where a different officer told her she could 
post a $20,000 bail. Felipe’s cousin was able to get him out on bail thirty 
minutes before ICE arrived the following day. Felipe retained an 
immigration attorney—in addition to a public defender—and the prosecutor 
dropped the fraudulent document charges at his arraignment. The only 
remaining charge was for driving without a license. 
Felipe’s account of his arrest and detention illustrates what may have 
been a racially—or ethnically—motivated stop. Had Felipe not had the help 
of his cousin or been unable to post bail, he would have been torn away 
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from his family and deported for a nonviolent crime. Unfortunately, 
Felipe’s story is not unique.73 
Though LLEAs should be responsible for discriminatory policing, DHS’s 
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) and ICE offer a 
complaint procedure for state and LLEA enforcement of S-Comm.74 
Through the complaint process after an investigation, CRCL will provide 
recommendations, including the referral of matters to authorities such as 
police oversight bodies or state attorneys general, identification of LLEA 
officers who may require disciplinary investigation, and increased training 
for officers on civil rights issues.75 However, unlike 287(g), through which 
state and local law enforcement agencies can partner with ICE through an 
MOA, “ICE need not have a formal partnership with the local law 
enforcement agencies whose arrests trigger an information flow to ICE 
through [S-Comm].”76 Consequently, CRCL may not have a “compulsory 
process” for complainants, and may not have the ability to require state and 
local law enforcement agencies to comply with CRCL/ICE investigations. 
According to ICE and CRCL, 
[the complaint investigation] process is useful to ensure that 
DHS’s activities do not function as a conduit or incentive for 
discriminatory policing, but it is important to note (and ICE will 
state, if asked) that DHS/ICE oversight of Secure Communities 
does not put DHS or ICE in a position to superintend all law 
                                                             
 
73 For other stories, see Costs and Consequences: The High Price of Policing Immigrant 
Communities, ACLU OF N. CAL. (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/police_practices/costs_and_consequences.p
df. 
74 See, e.g., Schlanger & Mead, supra note 66. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
346 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: VOICES FOR CHANGE 
enforcement conduct in jurisdictions where Secure Communities 
has been activated.77 
ICE further states that civil rights and/or community policing 
mechanisms that may aide in fulfilling LLEAs’ responsibility to abide by 
the constitutional obligation to avoid discriminatory policing have “nothing 
to do with Secure Communities or immigration enforcement. Accordingly, 
DHS will not discourage development or use of such mechanisms.”78 The 
position ICE and CRCL seemingly take regarding discriminatory practices 
suggests that government entities may either turn a blind eye to such 
practices or may choose not to regulate states or LLEAs with discriminatory 
practices. Additionally, CRCL consists of just six full-time employees and 
has a FY 2011 budget of $1.2 million, which is less than one ten-thousandth 
of DHS’s budget for 2011. With minimal capacity and limited resources, 
CRCL lacks the ability to oversee the roughly 1,508 jurisdictions in which 
S-Comm is activated. The Office would be stretched thin by handling 
complaints from the 3,181 jurisdictions nationwide in which ICE plans to 
implement the program.79 
C. Deportation of Individuals Convicted of Nonviolent Crimes 
As stated above, S-Comm leaves the fates of Level 2 and Level 3 
offenders up to the discretion of ICE officials, and ICE statistics show that 
the majority of individuals deported under S-Comm were arrested for 





79 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2011 BUDGET IN BRIEF, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib_fy2011.pdf. 
80 CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48; see also Teresa A. Miller, Lessons Learned, 
Lessons Lost: Immigration Enforcement’s Failed Experiment with Penal Severity, 38 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217 (2010) (exploring how immigration enforcement followed the 
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82 percent of S-Comm deportations are of noncriminals, while in San 
Diego, California, the figure is 63 percent.81 These deportations may cause 
more harm than good because undocumented immigrants play an integral 
role in the US economy.82 Many undocumented people live their lives for 
years as law-abiding workers, occupying jobs many US citizens would 
not.83 If S-Comm’s stated goal is deporting “criminal aliens,” these numbers 
suggest that ICE is not implementing the program in ways that meet that 
goal. 
ICE has made efforts to provide guidance for its officials making 
deportation decisions, but these officials are still allowed full discretion. In 
June 2011, ICE’s director, John Morton, issued a memorandum to ICE 
personnel to provide direction as to the use of prosecutorial discretion to 
ensure that immigration enforcement is focused on ICE’s priorities.84 
Among the factors to be considered when exercising prosecutorial 
discretion are a person’s criminal history, whether an individual poses a 
clear risk to national security, and whether an individual has an “egregious 
record” of immigration violations.85 However, Morton’s memo concludes 
by stating that a favorable exercise of discretion by ICE personnel is not a 
right, and that nothing in the memo “should be construed to prohibit the 
                                                                                                                                 
 
“tough on crime” movement in the criminal justice system and contributed to the over-
incarceration of immigrants). 
81 CCR Briefing Guide, supra note 48. 
82 See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO 
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS (New York Univ. Press 2007); see also 
Gordon H. Hanson, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, The Economic Logic of Illegal 






84 See Morton II, supra note 54. 
85 Id. 
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apprehension, detention, or removal of any alien unlawfully in the United 
States or to limit the legal authority of ICE or any of its personnel to enforce 
federal immigration law.”86 Because ICE personnel possess such broad 
discretion, they may still choose to exercise it in favor of deporting more 
individuals, rather than to focus solely on the most serious offenders.87 
D. Wrongful Deportation 
ICE files tens of thousands of cases in immigration courts each year and 
many are either thrown out or declared futile, creating a backlog in the 
courts and further highlighting ineffective government immigration 
reforms.88 Over the past five years, immigration court judges (IJs) 
terminated almost ninety-five thousand cases because there were no 
grounds for removal.89 IJs granted relief in more than one hundred fifty 
thousand cases during that same period of time. In total, nearly two hundred 
fifty thousand individuals were affected by futile ICE filings in the FY 
2006–10 period,90 and nearly 31 percent of ICE requests for deportation 
were rejected during the last quarter of FY 2010, up from roughly 25 
percent the previous year.91 In FY 2010, immigration courts in Los Angeles, 
Miami, New York City, and Philadelphia turned down more than half of 
ICE removal requests.92 
                                                             
 
86 See ICE, Letter from John Morton, supra note 39. 
87 For more information regarding prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, see 
Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. (June 
29, 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/understanding-prosecutorial-
discretion-immigration-law. 
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These statistics demonstrate that governmental efforts to remove 
undocumented immigrants can be shockingly ineffective. Some failures 
result from poorly designed immigration reform programs like S-Comm. In 
fact, such programs may undermine public faith in the government’s ability 
to implement effective changes,93 and may be costly and ineffective at both 
the law enforcement and court levels. As such, this is another area where 
both ICE and immigrants would benefit from the use of prosecutorial 
discretion. Such discretion would help unclog the overburdened 
immigration court system, lighten caseloads for ICE attorneys and 
immigrant advocates alike, and prevent unnecessary removal proceedings 
and deportations.  
E. Impact on Domestic Violence Survivors and Their Families 
Past repercussions of local immigration enforcement on noncitizen 
domestic violence survivors suggest that S-Comm will also have a severely 
detrimental effect on this vulnerable population.94 The negative impacts of 
local immigration enforcement on survivors of domestic violence may 
manifest in several ways. Most significantly, survivors of domestic violence 
are occasionally arrested wrongfully as the “primary aggressor” in a 
relationship, or through dual arrests.95 These survivors, already traumatized, 
                                                             
 
93 Id.; see also Sam Dolnick, Finished Probation in ‘80s, but Now Facing Deportation, 
N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Oct. 29, 2010, 11:37 AM), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/given-probation-in-80s-but-now-facing-
deportation/?ref=todayspaper. 
94 COLO. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Secure Communities Program 
Fact Sheet, (Sept. 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter COLO. COALITION Fact Sheet]; 
Fact Sheet: Intersection of Domestic Violence and the Secure Communities Program 
(Sept. 2010) (on file with author); see also Pendleton, supra note 63. 
95 COLO. COALITION Fact Sheet, supra note 94; see also Lisa R. Pruitt, Place Matters: 
Domestic Violence and Rural Difference, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 347, 403 (2008) 
(discussing racial and ethnic barriers preventing immigrants and other women from 
accessing law enforcement and other resources in rural areas); Ashley Arcidiacono, 
Comment, Silencing the Voices of Battered Women: How Arizona’s New Anti-
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may then be detained by ICE. Secondly, domestic violence offenders often 
report or threaten to report their victims to ICE or the police as a method of 
further victimization.96 Offenders may separate or threaten to separate 
survivors from their children through deportation or arrest, leaving children 
in the abusers’ custody, which may be physically or emotionally harmful to 
them.97 S-Comm provides an easy method for offenders to engage in such 
behavior. 
Survivors of domestic violence are already an at-risk group with 
considerable inhibitions about calling law enforcement, and S-Comm may 
further deter them from attempting to take protective measures.98 If their 
communities equate police with ICE agents, immigrant survivors of abuse 
will hesitate to call the police to notify them.99 This will also inhibit 
domestic violence survivors from taking advantage of protective forms of 
immigration relief like the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)100 that 
might help them gain independence from their abusers.101 Additionally, 
immigrant domestic violence survivors may not wish to report abuse if they 
                                                                                                                                 
 
Immigration Law “SB1070” Prevents Undocumented Women from Seeking Relief Under 
the Violence Against Women Act, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 173 (2010) (analyzing the effects 
of several provisions of Ariz. S.B. 1070 that negatively affect battered undocumented 
women); Michelle Decasas, Comment, Protecting Hispanic Women: The Inadequacy of 
Domestic Violence Policy, 24 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 56, 73 (2003) (discussing the 
effects of state domestic violence mandatory arrest policies on undocumented and 
immigrant women). 
96 See BRENDA K. UEKERT ET AL., THE NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SERVING 
LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENT (LEP) BATTERED WOMEN: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE 
COURTS' CAPACITY TO PROVIDE PROTECTION ORDERS 21 (2006), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/216072.pdf.  
97 Id. 
98 See Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing 
Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 870 (2009) (“The reluctance of victims to report and 
testify about domestic violence makes domestic violence one of the hardest crimes to 
prosecute.”). 
99 See Idilbi, supra note 70, at 1729–33. 
100 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2006). 
101 See Pendleton, supra note 63. 
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believe that someone will turn their abusers in to ICE.102 S-Comm currently 
has no protections in place for domestic violence survivors at the arrest 
stage, thus providing no safety net for survivors who police arrest 
simultaneously with their absuers.103 Without such protections, law 
enforcement cannot adequately respond to all domestic violence crimes.104 
As evidenced by proposed changes in Morton’s memos, ICE took note of 
S-Comm’s potential to harm survivors of domestic violence. Both the 
memo addressing prosecutorial discretion generally and the memo 
addressing prosecutorial discretion in cases involving certain survivors, 
witnesses, and plaintiffs address the need for particular care and 
consideration in the cases of domestic violence survivors. In these cases, 
ICE personnel should “exercise all appropriate prosecutorial discretion to 
minimize any effect that immigration enforcement may have on the 
willingness and ability of victims, witnesses, and plaintiffs to call police and 
pursue justice.”105 Absent special circumstances, it is against ICE policy to 
initiate removal proceedings against individuals known to be immediate 
crime survivors or witnesses.106 ICE further reiterates that there are 
provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)107 and VAWA 
that provide protections for victims of domestic violence and other crimes. 
Despite these reminders, immigrant rights advocacy groups remain 
                                                             
 
102 See Decasas, supra note 94 at 72. 
103 For suggested protections, see infra p. 384. 
104 COLO. COALITION Fact Sheet, supra note 94; see also Shankar Vedantam, Call for 
Help Leads to Possible Deportation for Hyattsville Mother, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/01/AR2010110103073.html. For suggested steps for police 
and prosecutors to take to encourage immigrant community members to report domestic 
violence, see Pendleton, supra note 63 at 4–5. 
105 Morton I, supra note 54. 
106 Id. 
107 Victims of Violence and Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§101–13, 114 
Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
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skeptical that ICE and LLEAs will exercise proper discretion and 
enforcement.108 
F. Detention for More than Forty-Eight Hours 
An ICE detainer allows an LLEA to maintain custody of an individual 
after local jurisdiction ends.109 After ICE issues a detainer, transfer of 
custody from LLEAs to ICE is not instantaneous. In theory, once ICE issues 
a detainer, a locality should not hold an individual for more than forty-eight 
hours before he or she is transferred to ICE.110 In practice, however, LLEAs 
often unlawfully detain individuals until after the detainer expires.111 
Unfortunately, unlike in criminal cases, indigent individuals in civil matters 
do not have a recognized right to government-funded counsel.112 Many 
individuals who are held on detainers are not aware that they have recourse 
for wrongful detention, or even that LLEAs are detaining them 
unlawfully.113 ICE detainers also place administrative burdens on LLEAs 
                                                             
 
108 Brittney Nystrom, Cosmetic Changes Are Not Enough: Secure Communities Program 
Needs Sweeping Reform, IMMPOLITIC BLOG (July 19, 2011), 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/blog/display/cosmetic-changes-are-not-enough-
secure-communities-program-needs-sweeping-r/. 
109 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2010) (“Upon a determination by the Department to issue a detainer 
for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall 
maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, 
Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department.”).  
110 Id. 
111 In Sacramento County, for example, ICE sometimes takes more than forty-eight hours 
to pick up detainees. In fact, one individual in a Sacramento detention facility had been 
detained—as of March 2011—since September 2010 due to a pending ICE hold. 
Telephone Interview with Jason Ramos, Deputy, Media Relations, Sacramento County 
Sheriff (Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Ramos Interview]. 
112 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 240(b)(4)(a), 8 U.S.C. § 
1229(a)(4)(a) (2006). 
113 IMMIGR. POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, Immigration Detainers: A 
Comprehensive Look, (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-
facts/immigration-detainers-comprehensive-look. Some inmates held under detainer for 
longer than forty-eight hours have been fortunate enough to obtain damages; see, e.g., 
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and expose them to potential civil liability for illegal arrests or for detaining 
individuals for unlawful periods. 
In June 2011, ICE attempted to address the issue of prolonged detention 
by crafting a revised detainer form, which ICE now sends to LLEAs to 
emphasize that state and local authorities must not detain an individual for 
more than forty-eight hours.114 The new form requires that LLEAs provide 
arrestees with a copy, which notifies the arrestee that he or she should not 
be detained beyond forty-eight hours.115 The form provides the phone 
number for the ICE Joint Intake Center, which arrestees may call if they 
have a complaint relating to the detainer or civil rights or civil liberties 
violations.116 ICE also plans to release a YouTube video briefing on ICE 
detainers, which may elaborate on proper compliance with detainers.117 
If ICE is able to ensure that LLEAs comply with the forty-eight hour 
maximum detention, and if ICE follows through with investigations of 
arrestees’ complaints, the agency may see some improvement in this area. 
However, in localities with strained budgets and overcrowded detention 
centers, LLEA vigilance in complying with custody limitations will likely 
not be satisfactory. 
                                                                                                                                 
 
Jacqueline Stevens, Deported New York City Resident Alleging Unlawful Detention Wins 
$145,000 Settlement from NYC and So Can You!, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS BLOG 
(Sept. 9, 2009, 6:05AM), http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2009/09/deported-
new-york-city-resident.html; Third Amended Complaint, Cecil O. Harvey v. City of New 
York, et al., No. 07 Civ. 0343 (NG)(LB) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.lawso.ucsb.edu/faculty/jstevens/113/HarveyComplaint1008.pdf. 
114 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETAINER—NOTICE OF ACTION (June 




117 See Briefing #1, supra note 71. 
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G. Improper Implementation 
Dealing with immigration “crime” is a matter distinct from detecting 
traffic violations or handling serious crimes such as robbery or murder. 
Most regulations governing traditional law enforcement are significantly 
less complex than immigration laws.118 State law enforcement officials are 
not likely to receive special training in immigration enforcement, which 
puts legal immigrants at risk for being mistaken as undocumented.119 
Further, ICE iterates time and again that S-Comm places no new burden on 
LLEAs. In fact, when LLEAs take on the burden of immigration 
enforcement, resources traditionally available for normal crime prevention 
are no longer at LLEAs’ disposal.120 
Neither DHS nor Congress oversees S-Comm’s implementation 
satisfactorily,121 though greater oversight may arise after ICE’s June 2011 
changes to the program. In 2010, the ACLU requested that the DHS Office 
of Inspector General audit the program for racial profiling and other abuses, 
as well as compliance with ICE’s priorities.122 Beginning in June 2011, ICE 
and CRCL started examining S-Comm data to identify LLEAs that may 
engage in “improper police practices,” in an effort to improve S-Comm’s 
implementation.123 Also in June 2011, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano 
                                                             
 
118 See Chandler, supra note 64, at 233. 
119 See id. 
120 See Petition by Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network to Sec’y Napolitano, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., http://action.altoarizona.com/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=4383 
(last visited Dec. 12, 2011). 
121 See ACLU Statement, supra note 3. 
122 See id. 
123 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. CIV. RTS. CIV. LIBERTIES, Overview of CRCL/ICE 
Quarterly Statistical Monitoring of Secure Communities (last revised Dec. 14, 2011),  
http://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=682235; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Secure 
Communities:  Statistical Monitoring, (last revised Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/statisticalmonitoring.pdf [hereinafter 
Statistical Monitoring]. 
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created the Task Force on Secure Communities,124 a subcommittee of the 
Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC).125 The task force released 
its findings and recommendations in September 2011, including criticism of 
S-Comm’s failure to adequately target serious offenders and reduce 
confusion in the program’s implementation.126 
While greater federal government oversight might address some of the 
detrimental effects of S-Comm, the federal government may not have the 
authority to enforce the program. The following section considers the 
appropriate roles of federal and local governments in immigration 
regulation and enforcement—and whether the federal government has that 
authority. 
IV. IMMIGRATION IS NO LONGER AN EXCLUSIVELY FEDERAL ISSUE: 
FEDERALISM AND THE AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE 
IMMIGRATION REFORM 
The Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution reserves powers not 
expressly delegated to the federal government for the states.127 Although the 
power to regulate immigration does not appear explicitly in the 
Constitution, it is generally understood that this power is reserved for the 
                                                             
 
124 Notably, five members of the nineteen-member task force resigned in disagreement 
with the rest of the committee, including a retired police chief and union members. Elise 
Foley, Secure Communities Task Force Releases Recommendations, Five Members 
Resign in Disagreement, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 16, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/16/secure-communities-task-
force_n_966318.html. 
125 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES, FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (Sept. 2011), available at 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/SComm%20Task%20Force%2
0Report%20091611.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. 
126 Id. at 11–14. 
127 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”). 
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federal government under the “Naturalization Clause”—Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 4 of the Constitution.128 Because the power of immigration 
regulation and enforcement is set aside for the federal government, the 
federal government cannot co-opt state resources for enforcement. 
During the early 1990s, the federal government crossed the line 
separating state and federal powers. In 1993, Congress enacted the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act),129 amending the 1968 Gun 
Control Act.130 The Brady Act called for interim provisions that instructed 
local law enforcement officials to participate in background checks required 
under the Gun Control Act.131 The federal government enlisted chief law 
enforcement officials (CLEOs) in administering federal laws, a 
responsibility that belongs to the executive branch.132 On certiorari, in 
Printz v. United States, the US Supreme Court held that the Brady Act’s 
imposition of a background check requirement on CLEOs was 
                                                             
 
128 The clause states, “Congress shall have Power . . . To establish a uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.” U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 4. This clause is problematic because federal 
immigration law addresses much more than just naturalization. See Chandler, supra note 
64, at 210. Another potential call for state and local immigration enforcement may be 
INA § 103(a)(10). That regulation grants the Attorney General (AG) the power to 
authorize, but not to compel, state and local officers to enforce immigration law if he or 
she determines that an “actual or imminent mass influx of aliens arriving . . . presents 
urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response.” 8 U.S.C. § 110 (2010). 
If the AG concludes that there is such an influx, he or she “may authorize any State or 
local law enforcement officer, with the consent of the head of the department, agency, or 
establishment under whose jurisdiction the individual is serving, to perform or exercise 
any of the powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this Act or regulations 
issued thereunder upon officers or employees of the Service.” Id. For a history of 
immigration in North America, see James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming 
the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and 
Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 35 (2010). 
129 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993). 
130 Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2011). 
131 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997). 
132 Id. 
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unconstitutional.133 The Court also held that the law improperly co-opted 
state officers to enforce federal regulations and eroded the system of “dual 
sovereignty,” undermining the separation of powers.134 This dual 
sovereignty enables states to retain autonomy, even though many powers 
are reserved to the federal government.135 
Further, Printz prohibits the federal government from ordering state and 
local governments to perform certain tasks.136 In Printz, the government 
described the executive branch’s historical use of state executive officers to 
administer federal programs. This description noted that the first 
Congresses enacted statutes requiring state courts to record citizenship 
applications, register aliens pursuing naturalization, issue certificates of 
registry, and send to the secretary of state summaries of such applications 
and other naturalization records.137 Printz’s progeny stated that the 
executive branch imposed these obligations with the states’ consent and 
could not be enforced without it.138 Judges may enforce federal law; 
Congress, however, is bound by the Constitution and cannot force state 
officers to carry out federal mandates, even for “limited, non-policymaking 
help in enforcing [such] law[s].”139 
In the majority opinion of Printz, Justice Scalia cited New York v. United 
States for the proposition that Congress cannot require states to enforce or 
enact a federal regulatory program.140 Printz expanded that prohibition by 
                                                             
 
133 Id. at 935. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 899. 
136 Id. at 904. 
137 Id. at 905–06. 
138 United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519–20 (1883). 
139 Printz, 521 U.S. at 927. 
140 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
In providing for a stronger central government, therefore, the Framers 
explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to 
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denying Congress the ability to evade commandeering issues by directly 
enlisting state officers to enforce or enact federal programs.141 Justice Scalia 
wrote: 
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the 
States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ 
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or 
enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether 
policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the 
burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are 
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual 
sovereignty.142 
By denying counties the ability to opt out of S-Comm, is the government 
implicitly issuing a directive requiring the states to address the “problem” of 
immigration? Do USCIS and ICE have the power to make a program like S-
Comm mandatory—or the ability to command state officers to enforce or 
administer such a regulatory program?143 According to HSAC’s Task Force, 
                                                                                                                                 
 
regulate individuals, not States. As we have seen, the Court has consistently 
respected this choice. We have always understood that even where Congress 
has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting 
certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or 
prohibit those acts. . . . The allocation of power contained in the Commerce 
Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce 
directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ 
regulation of interstate commerce. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
141 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. In 1996, section 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) encouraged information sharing between state and local 
entities and federal entities, providing: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, 
State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way 
restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the 
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual. 
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“DHS should clarify the statutory authority it relies upon to assert that local 
participation in Secure Communities is mandatory.”144 Because the federal 
government cannot commandeer state actors, courts may have to probe the 
issues present in Printz as they relate to S-Comm.145 
ICE is adamant that, under S-Comm, “state and local law enforcement 
officers are not deputized, do not enforce immigration law, and are not 
tasked with any additional responsibilities,” and that “only federal officers 
make immigration decisions, and they do so only after a completely 
independent decision by state and local law enforcement to arrest an 
individual for a criminal violation of state law separate and apart from any 
violations of immigration law.”146 However, in practice, not all states and 
LLEAs find the distinction to be so clear. 
Those concerned about separation of powers have raised questions about 
the fuzzy line between state and federal duties relating to immigration 
enforcement through S-Comm. District of Columbia Councilmember Jim 
Graham (D-Ward 1) expressed his disappointment over localities’ inability 
to opt out of S-Comm due to the “blurred line” between activities conducted 




8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2010). However, the constitutionality of § 642(a) has not been litigated 
fully. See Chandler, supra note 64. 
144 See TASK FORCE, supra note 125, at 15. 
145 287(g) agreements, however, allow the government and localities to curtail the issue 
of commandeering by entering in to memorandums of understanding. For more on 287(g) 
agreements, see infra p. 363. 
146 Secure Communities: Get the Facts, US IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF., 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2011). 
147 Shankar Vedantam, Local Jurisdictions Find They Can’t Opt Out of Federal 
Immigration Enforcement Program, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2010/09/30/ST2010093007299.html [hereinafter Vedantam, Local 
Jurisdictions]. 
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and the rest of the council sponsored a bill in May 2010 to opt out of S-
Comm.148 Graham stated: 
We had a bright line, and that has increased trust and confidence in 
our police among immigrant communities. That will now vanish. . 
. . It makes the local police department an arm of the federal 
immigration authority in a way that has not been true in the District 
of Columbia. . . . It also distracts scarce police resources—they 
have to hold people until ICE can get to them. We want those 
resources devoted to crime-fighting.149 
Graham’s concerns speak not only to the federalism issues S-Comm 
implicates, but also to the state resources that LLEAs potentially divert to 
the federal program at the expense of other law enforcement tasks. 
Despite political and social disapproval of S-Comm’s “blurred line,” 
courts are not likely to invalidate S-Comm under Printz. S-Comm may be 
“yet another example of local and federal agencies working together 
effectively to keep our communities safe.”150 Critics of local enforcement of 
immigration laws may be “too quick to read local actions directed toward 
immigrants as a subset of the national immigration controversy while 
ignoring the underlying local issues involved.”151 When courts maintain the 
belief that only federal reform can solve local immigration problems, they 
may unintentionally limit state and local responses.152 Such responses must 
                                                             
 
148 See Tim Craig, D.C. Council: Boycott Arizona, Don’t Share Arrest Data with Feds, 
WASH. POST D.C. WIRE BLOG (May 4, 2010, 11:27 AM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dc/2010/05/dc_council_boycott_arizona_don.html. 
149 Vedantam, Local Jurisdictions, supra note 147. “Of course, state regulation not 
congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the 
country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.” 
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1976). 
150 Desoto County News Release, supra note 10. 
151 Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 
1624 (2008). 
152See id.; see also Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 609–10 (2008) (discussing roles of all levels of 
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strike a careful balance to maintain a constitutionally proper separation of 
powers under Printz. 
In light of S-Comm, localities may or may not be mere creatures of the 
state.153 If a state opts to implement S-Comm, must localities also 
implement it? Another important concern is whether the federal government 
should subject immigration enforcement to centralized control. Centralized 
control may allow for greater uniformity of the law’s substance and 
enforcement, better oversight, and greater efficiency than decentralized 
control.154 In contrast, decentralized control allows localities to better cater 
to the interests, attitudes, and needs of their communities, while creating a 
platform for experimenting with evolving enforcement systems.155 
                                                                                                                                 
 
government in immigration enforcement in a “de facto [federal, state, and local] multi-
sovereign regime”); see also Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 72 (2007) (“For better and for worse, effective federal 
immigration enforcement often depends upon the extensive participation of state and 
local officials. This is particularly true regarding enforcement against immigrants who 
have been convicted of crimes in this country.”). 
153 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
154 See Chandler, supra note 64, at 231. 
155 See id. While the federalism debate surrounding immigration regulation presents an 
opportunity for reform, the United States is in need of broader immigration policy 
reform. The federal government should not  
 
dragoon states or localities into enforcement of immigration policies with 
which they disagree. States and localities should decide for themselves how to 
weigh the advantages of enforcing federal immigration policy—criminal or 
civil—against its significant costs. I would be much more trusting of local 
governments’ decisions to enforce federal immigration laws if they would give 
up their qualified immunity for mistakes that occur as a result and would spell 
out for the citizenry the heightened risks they face when those predisposed to 
conventional crime can take advantage of immigrant fears of cooperating with 
law enforcement. 
 
Id. at 242. For an interesting take on immigration reform, see Jennifer Gordon, Workers 
Without Borders, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2009, at A27, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/opinion/10gordon.html; see also Keith Aoki & John 
Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!: Assessing “Dystopian Dreams” and 
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However, any deference to local judgment should be narrowly tailored for 
the purpose of opting out of S-Comm. Sweeping deference to local 
governments could lead to sweeping permission across the country for 
programs like Arizona SB 1070.156 Among other things, SB 1070 prevents 
state and county officials and agencies from adopting policies that limit 
enforcement of federal immigration law, and it requires that state and 
county officials and agencies make reasonable attempts to determine the 
immigration status of persons who come in to “lawful” contact with 
LLEAs.157 
On May 26, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled on a state immigration law in 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.158 In that case, the Court held that an 
Arizona law prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented immigrants 
(the Legal Arizona Workers Act) was not preempted by federal law because 
it falls within an exemption established by the 1986 federal Immigration 
Reform and Control Act.159 In its analysis of applied preemption, the Court 
pointed to precedents establishing that “a high threshold must be met if a 
state law is to be pre-empted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal 
Act,” and determined that that threshold was not met in Whiting.160 The 
                                                                                                                                 
 
“Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and Considering Whether “Immigration 
Regionalism” Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1 (2010) 
(contemplating the pros and cons of “immigration regionalism” as a form of immigration 
reform). 
156 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
157 Id. 
158 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (internal 
citations omitted). 
159 Id. 
160 Id.; see also Mark Walsh, Raising Arizona High Court Eyes State’s Punishments for 
Hiring Unauthorized Aliens, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2010, at 20. 
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holding in Whiting suggests that the Court may be willing to uphold other 
state and local immigration enforcement initiatives.161 
A. 287(g) Agreements and MOAs 
Some critics view S-Comm as an expansive version of 287(g) 
agreements. Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
which Congress passed in 1995, permits state and LLEAs to enter into 
agreements with the federal government via MOAs.162 These MOAs allow 
appropriately trained officers to carry out immigration law activities, such 
as identification, processing, and detention of undocumented immigrants, in 
addition to their regular work.163 The executive branch supervises state 
officers acting under 287(g) agreements, and state employees or officers 
acting under 287(g) authority shall be considered “to be acting under color 
of [f]ederal authority” for liability purposes.164 Critics argue that officers are 
being commandeered, but this assertion would be easily challenged because 
officers acting pursuant to 287(g) agreements perform their functions as 
federal actors.165 Further, the United States Code affirmatively states that 
287(g) does not compel state officials to report anyone’s immigration status 
to the US Attorney General (AG) or even to cooperate with the AG in 
identifying, arresting, or removing undocumented immigrants.166 
                                                             
 
161 Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became Ground Zero for 
the Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino Civil Rights in 
America, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 12 (2011). 
162 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). This law enables states and localities to enforce immigration laws 
pursuant to a signed agreement with the US Attorney General, but cannot be construed to 
require states or localities to sign such an agreement. 
163 See id. 
164 “An officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State shall be subject to 
the directions and supervision of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). 
165 See McThomas, supra note 45. 
166 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). A staff attorney with a social justice organization in North 
Carolina coordinates the organization’s immigrant rights work. He believes that the 
overlapping jurisdiction between 287(g) agreements and S-Comm creates difficulty in 
364 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: VOICES FOR CHANGE 
ICE has not established the extent of its guidance over 287(g), although 
the law calls for ICE supervision of state and local officials. As a result, 
ICE field officials have different understandings of the nature and extent of 
their responsibilities as supervisors. For example, one official stated that the 
agency does not directly supervise LLEAs in the 287(g) program.167 In 
contrast, another ICE official said that ICE supervisors provide “frontline 
support” for the program.168 
For the first several years of S-Comm’s existence, it was unclear in what 
capacity LLEAs acted when they sent fingerprints to IFAIS. Were they state 
actors or federal actors?  Did LLEAs’ acts fall within the doctrine of 
“concurrent enforcement,”169 which is authorized only where “state 
enforcement activities do not impair federal regulatory interests”?170 ICE 
has since clarified that the power to enforce immigration rests exclusively 
with DHS.171  
                                                                                                                                 
 
determining which of the cases that come to him are a result of 287(g) enforcement and 
which are S-Comm cases. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Attorney (Oct. 7, 2010, 
10:00 AM) (Anonymity is preserved here at the request of the attorney) [hereinafter 
Interview with NC Attorney]; Ramos Interview, supra note 111. 
167 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 09-381T, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: 
CONTROLS OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 4 (Mar. 4, 2009) (testimony 
of Richard M. Stana, Dir., Homeland Sec. & Justice), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09381t.pdf. 
168 Id. For more information regarding the effectiveness of 287(g), see IMMIGR. POLICY 
CTR., AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, GIVING FACTS A FIGHTING CHANCE: ANSWERS TO THE 
TOUGHEST IMMIGRATION QUESTIONS (2010), available at 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Giving_Facts_a_Fighting_Cha
nce_100710.pdf. 
169 Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 218 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S.Ct. 2958 
(2011). 
170 Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by 
Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
171 See Briefing #1, supra note 71. 
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Regardless of the role LLEAs play when participating in S-Comm, the 
program’s activities must be funded. The next section discusses who should 
provide this funding. 
B. The Financial Impact of Implementing S-Comm 
ICE planned to spend $1.4 billion of congressional allowances in FY 
2009 on “criminal alien enforcement,”172 but it is unclear how much of the 
funding localities received specifically for implementing S-Comm. Though 
ICE budgeted $200 million for “Secure Communities/Comprehensive 
Identification and Removal of Criminal Aliens (SC/CIRCA)” in 2010, its 
enacted budget does not detail specifically how it would allocate those 
funds. The budget does state that $43.5 million of new funding, and forty-
six full-time employees, were allocated to S-Comm.173 The US Department 
of Justice’s FY 2011 Budget Request calls for an $11 million increase to its 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) budget, which will 
support hiring more IJs and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) attorneys 
needed to address an increase in caseload resulting from DHS programs 
such as S-Comm.174 
Even though DHS and ICE claim that S-Comm does not impose costs on 
localities, and that local sheriffs are just agreeing to hold individuals until 
ICE can pick them up, the individuals held by LLEAs pursuant to detainers 
are not actually in ICE custody. While these individuals remain in LLEA 
                                                             
 
172 U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF., Secure Communities Program Presentations 
(2009),  
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiespresentations.pdf. 
173 ICE Fiscal Year 2010 Enacted Budget, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF. (Nov. 5, 
2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/doc/2010budgetfactsheet.doc; 
see also Nancy Lofholm, Program to Find Criminal Illegal Immigrants Hampered in 
Colo. By Pricey Equipment, DENVER POST, July 6, 2011, 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_18415336. 
174 US DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 BUDGET REQUEST, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011factsheets/pdf/enforce-immigration-laws.pdf. 
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custody, those LLEAs must use their resources to detain them. According to 
Anjali Bhargava, former deputy county counsel at the Santa Clara County 
Counsel’s Office, ICE provides no “trickle down” funding specifically for 
communities implementing S-Comm.175 LLEAs may nevertheless be able to 
recuperate some of their expenses via the State Criminal Alien Assistance 
Program (SCAAP).176 SCAAP provides federal reimbursements to states 
and localities that have borne costs for detaining undocumented immigrants 
with at least one state or local felony conviction, or two misdemeanor 
convictions, for at least four or more consecutive days.177 
While SCAAP benefits LLEAs, it not likely an effective solution to the 
problem of funding S-Comm. LLEAs incur greater costs as the number of 
required detainers increases. Over time, a larger amount of LLEAs’ 
resources will be devoted to detaining undocumented individuals.178 While 
reimbursement may be secured through SCAAP, localities may have to 
advance the money and hope for repayment in the future. Additionally, 
jurisdictions typically request more in reimbursements than SCAAP can 
pay.179 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that SCAAP 
payments to the four states with the highest number of SCAAP 
undocumented immigrants in FY 2003 covered less than 25 percent of the 
                                                             
 
175 Telephone Interview with Anjali Bhargava, former Deputy Cnty. Counsel, Santa Clara 
Cnty. Counsel’s Office (Oct. 5, 2010). 
176 Bureau of Justice Assistance, State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/scaap.html (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2010) [hereinafter SCAAP]. For a discussion of funding issues present in 287(g) 
Agreement enforcement, see Idilbi, supra note 70, at 1743–41. 
177 SCAAP, supra note 176. 
178 For more information on the economic ramifications of immigration enforcement at 
the local level, see Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, The Economic Impact of Local 
Immigration Regulation: An Empirical Analysis, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 485, 518 (2010). 
179 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 
07-07, COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS 
FROM THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/OJP/a0707/final.pdf. 
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approximate cost to detain those individuals.180 In FY 2003, SCAAP 
payments covered just 12 percent of estimated detention costs for 
California, 14 percent for Arizona, 7 percent for Florida, and 24 percent for 
New York.181 
State governments are also unable to adequately cover expenses that 
LLEAs incur implementing S-Comm. For example, California’s 
constitution requires that the state reimburse local governments for 
expenditures they incur in implementing legislative- or state-agency-
mandated programs.182 Because S-Comm is a federal program, however, the 
state may not be constitutionally required to fund it.183 For example, 
California’s constitution only mandates funding when the state adopts a 
regulation pursuant to a federal mandate and has no choice in the manner of 
its execution.184 Because of the mixed messages regarding whether S-
Comm is a federal mandate, this constitutional provision may or may not 
apply. If California’s constitutional provision does apply, California 
counties would be able to appeal to the Commission of State Mandates to 
request funding. As it stands, California counties do not receive state 





182 “Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher 
level of service on any local government, the State shall provide a subvention of funds to 
reimburse that local government for the costs of the program or increased level of service 
[with the exception of] (1) Legislative mandates requested by the local agency affected. 
(2) Legislation defining a new crime or changing an existing definition of a crime (3) 
Legislative mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or executive orders or regulations 
initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January 1, 1975.” CAL. CONST. art. 
13B, § 6. 
183 See Cnty of Los Angeles v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419 (Ct. App. 
2003); Cnty of Los Angeles v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304 (Ct. 
App. 1995), holding modified sub nom; Dep’t of Fin. v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 122 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 447 (Ct. App. 2002); Hayes v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
547 (Ct. App. 1992). 
184 CAL. CONST. art. 13B, § 6. 
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reimbursement fails to cover the entire cost of detaining undocumented 
immigrants at the LLEA level. 
Though immigration has historically been a federal issue, state and local 
governments have varying methods of addressing and implementing 
immigration enforcement. As local governments take on immigration 
regulation tasks, thus incurring risks and financial burdens, the federal 
government toes the line between commandeering and allowing optional 
compliance with immigration regulation at the local level. Local 
compliance via 287(g) has its costs, and some localities may wish to refuse 
to enforce immigration all together. The following section will discuss a 
unique approach for limiting immigration enforcement at the local level. 
V. SANCTUARY CITIES AS A METHOD OF RESISTANCE TO S-COMM 
In the 1980s, many US cities adopted “sanctuary city” policies or 
designations designed to protect undocumented immigrants.185 During that 
time, churches across the United States sheltered Central Americans 
escaping civil wars in their home countries.186 The term “sanctuary city” 
may describe municipalities that have adopted “sanctuary, non-cooperation, 
or confidentiality policies for undocumented residents, which may be 
viewed as inclusionary types of laws.”187 Such policies may be de jure or de 
facto and may be manifested by prohibiting use of municipal funds for 
enforcing federal immigration laws or by requiring municipal employees to 
refrain from inquiring about an individual’s immigration status.188 When 
                                                             
 
185 Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 135 (2008). 
186 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12H (1989), available at 
http://www.sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1069 [hereinafter ADMIN. CODE]. 
187 Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 573, 577 (2010). 
188 Some critics believe that sanctuary city efforts may have inadvertently helped open the 
door for states and localities to enforce immigration. The idea of sanctuary cities may 
have been better packaged as a public safety initiative. By agreeing not to participate in 
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LLEAs refuse to enforce immigration laws, are they enforcing a 
“sanctuary” policy, or are they simply refusing to take on a task performed 
historically by the federal government? Though the answer varies, 
sanctuary cities like San Francisco may have a stronger argument for opting 
out of programs like S-Comm. 
A. San Francisco’s “Sanctuary” 
The San Francisco Board of Supervisors first declared the city a 
sanctuary city in 1989, prohibiting city employees from assisting ICE with 
arrests or immigration investigations unless required by warrant or state or 
federal law.189 Representing one of the governments that “[has] stood firmly 
against repressive immigration proposals in Congress and immigration raids 
that separate families,” former San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom issued 
an executive order in February 2007 asking city departments to develop 
training and procedures on the city’s Sanctuary Ordinance.190 
San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance prohibits any San Francisco city or 
county agency, commission, department, employee, or officer from using 
any city funds or resources to assist in the enforcement of federal 
immigration law, or the dissemination or gathering of information about the 
immigration status of persons in the city or county unless required by state 
or federal regulation, statute, or court decision.191 Such assistance includes 
cooperating or assisting, in an individual’s official capacity, with any 
                                                                                                                                 
 
activities such as assisting ICE with arrests or immigration investigations, undocumented 
immigrants will likely be more willing to provide information to police and comply with 
local law enforcement investigations. See Dean Johnson Interview, supra note 60. 
189
 ADMIN. CODE, supra note 185. 
190 Id. In 2007, Newsom also vowed to discourage federal officials from performing 
immigration raids. Peter Fimrite, Newsom Says S.F. Won’t Help with Raids, S.F. CHRON., 
April 23, 2007, at B-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/04/23/BAGOHPDLLT1.DTL#ixzz11t698wiI. 
191 ADMIN. CODE, supra note 185, § 2. 
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USCIS detention, investigation, or arrest procedure dealing with alleged 
violations of federal immigration law provisions.192 
The ordinance, however, does not prohibit (nor should it be construed as 
prohibiting) law enforcement officers from identifying and reporting 
persons pursuant to federal or state regulation or law who, after being 
booked for the alleged commission of a felony, are in custody and suspected 
of violating civil provisions of immigration laws.193 Further, the ordinance 
does not preclude San Francisco County or City actors194 from reporting 
arrests of previously convicted felons to USCIS, cooperating with USCIS 
requests for information about convicted felons, or reporting information as 
per federal or state statute, court decision, or regulation.195 Perhaps the most 
important protection that the ordinance provides is its prohibition against 
county or city employees, officers, or law enforcement agencies stopping, 
                                                             
 
192 Such assistance also includes, but is not limited to: 
(b) Assisting or cooperating, in one’s official capacity, with any investigation, 
surveillance or gathering of information conducted by foreign governments, 
except for cooperation related to an alleged violation of City and County, State 
or federal criminal laws.  
(c) Requesting information about, or disseminating information regarding, the 
immigration status of any individual, or conditioning the provision of services 
or benefits by the City and County of San Francisco upon immigration status, 
except as required by federal or State statute or regulation, City and County 
public assistance criteria, or court decision.  
(d) Including on any application, questionnaire or interview form used in 
relation to benefits, services or opportunities provided by the City and County 
of San Francisco any question regarding immigration status other than those 
required by federal or State statute, regulation or court decision. 
   Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Defined as “department, agency, commission, officer or employee[s].” Id. 
195 Id. 
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questioning, detaining, or arresting individuals exclusively because of their 
immigration status or national origin.196 
Long-time San Francisco sheriff Michael Hennessey has consistently 
been outspoken in his criticism of San Francisco’s potential implementation 
of S-Comm. In May 2010, Hennessey wrote a letter to then-California 
Attorney General Jerry Brown requesting assistance in opting out of S-
Comm.197 Hennessey’s concern was that S-Comm conflicted with San 
Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance.198 He stated that his department had 
“delivered” more than 3,100 people to ICE, and that he intended to continue 
reporting “foreign-born individuals” charged with felonies, or having a 
felony, or having “previous ICE contact in their criminal histories,” directly 
to ICE.199 After a meeting with ICE officials on November 9, 2010, San 
Francisco did not opt out of S-Comm due to ICE’s explanation that counties 
cannot prevent the data sharing necessary for S-Comm’s implementation.200 
At the same meeting, ICE’s S-Comm director, David Venturella, reportedly 
stated that LLEAs were not required to respond to detainers.201 Under 








199 Id. According to the US Census Bureau, 34.4 percent of San Francisco County 
residents between 2005 and 2009 were foreign born. State and County QuickFacts, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06075.html (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2011). 
200 Elise Foley, San Francisco won’t opt out of Secure Communities, THE WASH. 
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 9, 2010,  http://washingtonindependent.com/103084/san-francisco-
wont-opt-out-of-secure-communities. 
201 Id. 
372 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: VOICES FOR CHANGE 
misdemeanors will not be held in LLEA custody while ICE checks their 
status under S-Comm.202 
B. Congressional Restriction on Sanctuary Cities 
In 1996, Congress enacted a law stating that state and local government 
entities may not be prohibited from sending information to or receiving 
information from the INS (now USCIS) regarding individuals’ immigration 
statuses.203 The “clear target” of provisions like this was non-enforcement 
attempts by localities like San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance.204 The city 
of New York challenged Congress’s “anti-sanctuary measure” shortly after 
it was enacted.205 The court in City of New York v. United States held that 
Section 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform Act) and Section 642 of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) did 
not force state or local governments to administer federal programs in 
violation of the Tenth Amendment.206 According to the court, New York 
City’s sovereignty argument asked the court to 
                                                             
 
202 SF Sheriff Plans to Defy Fed’s Secure Communities Program, (KTVU television 
broadcast, May 30, 2011), available at http://www.ktvu.com/news/28067653/detail.html. 
203 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2010). 
204 Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 
1635–36 (2008). Notably, the Loophole Elimination and Verification Enforcement Act 
(LEAVE), authored by former US Senator Gary Miller (R-Calif.), would forbid sanctuary 
cities from obtaining funds from the DOJ and DHS for immigration enforcement. See 
Joshua Rhett Miller, DOJ Gave Millions to Illegal Immigrant ‘Sanctuaries,’ Report 
Finds, FOX NEWS (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/11/12/doj-gave-
millions-sanctuary-communities-report-finds/. 
205 See Su, supra note 204. 
206 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999). Both the Welfare 
Reform Act and IIRIRA prohibited state and local governments from restricting 
employees from voluntarily providing information about individuals’ immigration status 
to INS.  
Insecure Communities 373 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2011 
[t]urn the Tenth Amendment’s shield against the federal 
government’s using state and local governments to enact and 
administer federal programs into a sword allowing states and 
localities to engage in passive resistance that frustrates federal 
programs. If Congress may not forbid states from outlawing even 
voluntary cooperation with federal programs by state and local 
officials, states will at times have the power to frustrate 
effectuation of some programs. Absent any cooperation at all from 
local officials, some federal programs may fail or fall short of their 
goals unless federal officials resort to legal processes in every 
routine or trivial matter, often a practical impossibility.207 
The City of New York decision and the 1996 law demonstrate 
congressional and judicial discouragement of local resistance to federal 
immigration laws. However, sanctuary policies and policies such as Los 
Angeles’s Special Order Number 40 still withstand challenges. 
C. Los Angeles’s Special Order Number 40 
In 1979 the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners adopted a 
policy that lead to Special Order Number 40, which states that Los Angeles 
Police Department Officers shall not “initiate police action with the 
objective of discerning the alien status of a person. Officers shall not arrest 
or book person [sic] for [illegal entry].”208 In Sturgeon v. Bratton, a 
California Court of Appeals found that Special Order Number 40 did not 
conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which addresses “voluntary” exchange of 
information between government entities or officials and federal 




208 Special Order No. 40, Office of the Chief of Police of Los Angeles (Nov. 27, 1979), 
available at http://www.lapdonline.org/get_informed/pdf_view/44798. 
209 Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 1411 (2009). 
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Local choices like implementing sanctuary ordinances and Special Order 
Number 40 evince localities’ desire to have a say as to whether they enforce 
immigration laws. As such, self-declared sanctuary cities have a stronger 
argument for opting out of S-Comm. The next section will discuss if and 
how cities like San Francisco might be able to opt out of the program. 
VI. OPTING OUT AS A SOLUTION FOR CITIES AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
Over the past year-and-a-half, states and localities have had difficulty 
determining ICE’s stance regarding whether they can opt out of S-Comm. 
On September 7, 2010, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano sent 
a letter to Zoe Lofgren, member of the US House of Representatives (D-
CA) and chair of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, 
Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, explaining the conditions 
under which an LLEA may opt out of S-Comm.210 Napolitano’s letter stated 
that 
[a] local law enforcement agency that does not wish to participate 
in the Secure Communities deployment plan must formally notify 
the Assistant Director for the Secure Communities program, David 
Venturella. . . . The agency must also notify the appropriate state 
identification bureau by mail, facsimile, or e-mail. If a local law 
enforcement agency chooses not be activated in the Secure 
Communities deployment plan, it will be the responsibility of that 




210 Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to the Hon. Zoe Lofgren, 
Member, US House of Representatives and Chair, House Subcomm. on Immigr., 
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and Int’l Law, and Committee on the Judiciary 
(Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/Z-
Lofgren_Response-from-USDOJ-and-DHS.09.08.2010.pdf. 
211 Id. 
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ICE described a similar opt-out procedure in a memo released in late 
August 2010.212 On September 8, 2010, Assistant US Attorney General 
Ronald Weich responded to a letter from Lofgren asking for a “clear 
explanation of how local law enforcement agencies may opt out of Secure 
Communities by having the fingerprints they collect and submit to the SIBs 
checked against criminal, but not immigration, databases.”213 Weich’s letter 
echoed Napolitano’s instructions.214 
Despite these official responses, local jurisdictions are finding that they 
cannot opt out of S-Comm.215 An anonymous senior ICE official stated that 
Secure Communities is not based on state or local cooperation in 
federal law enforcement. The program’s foundation is information 
sharing between FBI and ICE. State and local law enforcement 
agencies are going to continue to fingerprint people and those 
fingerprints are forwarded to FBI for criminal checks. ICE will 
take immigration action appropriately.216 
                                                             
 
212 Elise Foley, ICE Changes Its Mind on Secure Communities Opt-Out, WASH. 
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 1, 2010, http://washingtonindependent.com/99382/ice-changes-its-
mind-on-secure-communities-opt-out. The memo stated: 
If a jurisdiction does not wish to activate on its scheduled date in the Secure 
Communities deployment plan, it must formally notify its state identification 
bureau and ICE in writing (email, letter or facsimile). Upon receipt of that 
information, ICE will request a meeting with federal partners, the jurisdiction, 
and the state to discuss any issues and come to a resolution, which may include 
adjusting the jurisdiction’s activation date in or removing the jurisdiction from 
the deployment plan. 
   Id. 
213 Letter from Ronald Weich, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Zoe 
Lofgren, Chair, House Subcomm. on Immigr., Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l 
Law (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://crocodoc.com/yzmmKP. 
214 Letter from Janet Napolitano, supra note 210. 
215 Vedantam, Local Jurisdictions, supra note 147. 
216 Id. 
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As a result, the only option for a local jurisdiction to opt out of S-Comm 
is if the state declines to send fingerprints to the FBI, thus withholding them 
from ICE.217 Because prosecutors and law enforcement need to know the 
criminal histories of arrestees, this method is unrealistic. The ICE official 
said that municipalities could, however, choose to have immigration 
authorities withhold the reason for someone’s detention, but those 
municipalities would still be required to detain the individual.218 
In October 2010, CCR, NDLON, and the Kathryn O. Greenberg 
Immigration Justice Clinic of the Cardozo School of Law filed suit in 
federal court alleging ICE’s noncompliance with a FOIA request and 
seeking a writ of mandamus ordering ICE to release documents explaining 
how communities can opt out of S-Comm.219 At that time, Arlington, 
Virginia, San Francisco, and Santa Clara, California, had all submitted 
formal requests to opt out of the program.220 In February 2011, CCR, 
NDLON, and the Justice Clinic released S-Comm documents they obtained 
through the FOIA suit.221 Their guide to the documents, and the documents 





219 Marcos Restrepo, Immigrant Rights Groups File Injunction for Secure Communities 
Opt-Out Info, FLA. INDEPENDENT, Oct. 28, 2010, 
http://floridaindependent.com/12096/immigrant-rights-groups-file-injunction-for-secure-
communities-opt-out-info. 
220 For a summary of the opt-out dilemma, see Suzanne Gamboa, Documents Show 




221 Newly Released Secure Communities Documents Signal Opening for Local Opt-Out, 
UNCOVER THE TRUTH BLOG (Feb. 17, 2011), http://uncoverthetruth.org/featured/newly-
released-secure-communities-documents-signal-opening-for-local-opt-out/; Ctr. for 
Const. Rights et al., Preliminary Briefing Guide: Newly Released Documents Chronicle 
Agency’s Deception About Opting-Out of “Secure Communities” Program (Feb. 17, 
2011), http://ndlon.org/feb/foiabrief.pdf. 
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reiterate that, although ICE publicly announced that S-Comm is a 
“mandatory” program, the agency remained unclear about a legal basis for 
mandatory implementation.222 
On July 6, 2011, CCR, Cardozo, and NDLON issued a fact sheet 
outlining more information extracted from their FOIA requests. This fact 
sheet details the FBI’s intention that S-Comm be a part of its Next 
Generation Identification Project (NGI).223 NGI aims to reduce criminal and 
terrorist activities by expanding criminal history information biometric 
identification services.224 NGI will include digital photographs for 
automated facial recognition scans, as well as iris scans and voice 
identification.225 According to the fact sheet prepared by CCR, Cardozo, 
and NDLON, the FOIA documents demonstrate that the FBI, rather than 
DHS, was the first agency to seek mandatory implementation of S-Comm—
and that the FBI fears that states’ ability to opt out of S-Comm may 
promote states’ questioning their participation in NGI.226 
ICE Director John Morton issued a memorandum on August 5, 2011 
declaring that an MOA is not required for any jurisdiction to activate or 
operate S-Comm.227 This demonstrates the federal government’s investment 
in implementing S-Comm mandatorily, even if the program exists to the 




223 Ctr. for Const. Rights, et al., Next Generation Identification: The FBI’s ‘Big Brother’ 
Surveillance Agenda, UNCOVER THE TRUTH BLOG (July 6, 2011), 
http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/7-6-11-Scomm-NGI-Fact-Sheet.pdf 
[hereinafter CCR, Next Generation]. 
224 Next Generation Identification, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
225 Id. 
226 See CCR, Next Generation, supra note 223. 
227 Letter from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf., to Hon. Jack Markell, 
Gov. of Del. (Aug. 5, 2011), available at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/27924754/Sec-
Comm%20govlet%208-5-11.pdf. 
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law enforcement agency voluntarily submits fingerprint data to the federal 
government, no agreement with the state is legally necessary for one part of 
the federal government to share it with another part.”228 Consequently, ICE 
will terminate all existing S-Comm MOAs.229 Chris Newman, the legal 
director of NDLON, declared that ICE’s August 5 announcement “shows 
that ICE also systematically misled the states, engaging in protracted 
negotiations—at substantial cost to the American public—for what it now 
claims are sham contracts.”230 Mr. Newman’s remark reflects widespread 
frustration with the lack of clarity and consistency that the government has 
provided since S-Comm’s inception. 
Mr. Morton enclosed a fact sheet with his August 5 memorandum, which 
addresses frequently asked questions about S-Comm. Among the questions 
answered is: “[c]an a state or local law enforcement agency choose not to 
have fingerprints it submits to the FBI checked against DHS’ system?”231 
ICE responded that   
Secure Communities is mandatory in that, once the information-
sharing capability is activated for a jurisdiction, the fingerprints 
that state and local law enforcement voluntarily submit to the FBI 
to be checked against the DOJ’s biometric identification system 
for criminal history records are automatically sent to DHS’s 






230 Julian Aguilar, Feds: Secure Communities Not Optional, THE TEX. TRIB., Aug. 5, 
2011, http://www.texastribune.org/immigration-in-texas/immigration/feds-secure-
communities-staying-place/. 
231 Secure Communities: Frequently Asked Questions, Addendum to Governor 
Notifications, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF. (Aug. 5, 2011), at 5, available at 
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/27924754/Sec-Comm%20FAQ%208-5-11.pdf [hereinafter ICE 
FAQs]. 
232 Id. 
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ICE goes on to affirm that states and LLEAs may not choose to have 
fingerprints processed by the federal government only to check an 
individual’s criminal history, nor may states or LLEAs ask that 
“identifications” resulting from DHS’s fingerprint processing be withheld 
from local ICE field offices.233 This recent information from ICE reinforces 
the agency’s position that states and localities may not opt out of S-Comm. 
It appears now that the only option states and local jurisdictions have is to 
elect not to receive information about identifications resulting from DHS’s 
fingerprint databases provided to local ICE field offices.234 
A. Affirmative Actions for Non-Complying Cities 
Prior to ICE’s August 5 fact sheet describing S-Comm’s mandatory 
requirements, it was unclear how much a locality could do to affirmatively 
resist participation in the program. Passively, a city may still be able to 
decline to arrest undocumented immigrants, and sheriffs can refuse to issue 
ICE detainers, but these options give rise to complications. If a locality has 
a sanctuary policy, it may be able to decline compliance with detainers due 
to S-Comm’s conflict with the policy.235  
Because S-Comm shares data between two federal departments (DHS 
and FBI), the only way a jurisdiction could avoid taking part in S-Comm is 
by refusing to send fingerprints to the federal justice system,236 even though 
they have the legal authority to decide when to hold an individual subject to 
an ICE detainer.237 However, ICE has since declared that this is not an 
                                                             
 
233 Id. at 5–6. 
234 Id. 
235 See infra Part V. 
236 See Semple, supra note 41. 
237 Memorandum from Immigr. Justice Clinic, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law on 
Local Discretion to Not Hold Detainees Subject to Immigration Detainers (Apr. 16, 2010) 
(on file with the author). 
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option,238 and, as stated above, this choice would seriously undermine the 
crime-fighting functions of LLEAs.239 LLEAs that decline to share 
fingerprints with the Justice Department would lose access to state and 
federal criminal databases.240 
LLEAs still have the power to elect whether to review the information 
DHS returns to them in response to the fingerprints.241 However, the choice 
not to review this information does little more than turn a blind eye to 
practices in which LLEAs do not want to participate. The choice leaves 
localities with little control: ICE maintains the ability to initiate deportation 
of individuals in question, regardless of an LLEA’s position on the 
matter.242 Further, since ICE’s termination of MOAs, states no longer have 
the option to request that the MOAs be revised to better align the 
agreements with local priorities. 
Some activists would choose a more court-based, and perhaps more 
proactive, method of protest. They believe that government trial attorneys 
are not enforcing their stated priorities and that immigration courts should 
weigh in. One possible method for bringing issues with S-Comm to DHS’s 
attention is to file complaints in all cases that are not responding to Level 1 
or Level 2 criminals. This would place a large burden on the court and force 




238 See ICE FAQs, supra note 231. 
239 Id. 
240  See Semple, supra note 41. 
241 See id.; see also ICE FAQs, supra note 231. 
242 See id. 
243 See Interview with NC Attorney, supra note 166. 
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B. S-Comm in California and Assemblymember Ammiano’s TRUST Act 
In May 2009, the California Department of Justice entered into an MOA 
with ICE regarding implementation of S-Comm in the state.244 Since then, 
S-Comm has been activated in all fifty-eight LLEA jurisdictions, including 
Santa Clara County.245 When Santa Clara County received information from 
ICE in October 2009, the county understood the program as voluntary and 
did not take action or return a questionnaire about current county jail 
booking practices.246 
ICE notified Santa Clara County in April 2010 of its plan to activate S-
Comm in the jurisdiction.247 Although the Board of Supervisors had not 
approved participation, ICE activated S-Comm in the county in May 2010, 
stating that approval from the Board was not required.248 Despite a 
unanimous decision by the Board to opt out of the program, S-Comm in 
Santa Clara County led to 523 individuals being arrested or booked into 
ICE custody from the beginning of May 2010 until the end of September 
2010.249 One hundred thirty-three of those individuals had no criminal 
record.250 Implementation in Santa Clara County also led to 241 people 




244 Memorandum of Agreement Between Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Immigr. & Customs 




245 NATIONWIDE ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 11, at 2. 
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Despite statements that localities may not opt out of S-Comm, Santa 
Clara and several other counties are looking for ways to minimize the 
effects of the program. For example, Santa Clara County’s counsel 
presented a report to the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors’ Public 
Safety and Justice Committee suggesting that the board direct the county 
administration to make certain that no county funds are used to “provide 
unreimbursed assistance to [US] Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
including assistance requested through immigration detainers,” except as 
prescribed by law.252 Taking the report into account, the committee 
instructed the county counsel and other county departments to collaborate 
and develop a recommendation about complying with detainers that also 
considers public safety.253 
On the state level, California Assemblymember Tom Ammiano 
introduced the TRUST Act (AB 1081) in February 2011. AB 1081, labeled 
the Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools Act, or “TRUST 
Act,” calls for modifications to the now-rescinded MOA between 
California’s Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information and DHS 
regarding S-Comm.254 The TRUST Act would authorize counties to 
participate in S-Comm only upon submission of an authorized request to 
ICE by the county’s legislative body,255 thus allowing counties to choose 
whether to participate in the program. The TRUST Act also provides 
                                                             
 
252 Report from Anjali Bhargava, Deputy Cnty. Counsel, Santa Clara Cnty. Counsel, to 
Santa Clara Cnty. Board of Supervisors’ Pub. Safety & Justice Comm. Regarding U.S. 
Immigr. & Customs Enf.’s Secure Communities Program (Dec. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.sccgov.org/keyboard/attachments/Committee%20Agenda/2010/December%2
02,%202010/202898007/KeyboardTransmittalWeb203302392.PDF. 
253 E-mail from Anjali Bhargava, Deputy Cnty. Counsel, Santa Clara Cnty. Counsel’s 
Office (Feb. 17, 2010, 12:37 PM) (on file with author). 
254 A.B. 1081, 2011–12 Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_1051-
1100/ab_1081_bill_20110608_amended_sen_v96.html. 
255 Id. § 7282(a)(1). 
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directives for safeguards against racial profiling, protections for victims of 
crime, including survivors of domestic violence, and a requirement that ICE 
establish a complaint process and provide quarterly statistics on S-Comm 
on its website.256 The act passed the California Assembly in May 2011, and 
will be revised in early January before it goes to the state senate.257 Though 
Ammiano’s act addresses the important concerns S-Comm’s 
implementation raises, it may not be viable in light of ICE’s rescission of 
MOAs. If ICE’s June 2011 reforms are effective—and ICE officials and 
attorneys do indeed exercise care and discretion in immigration 
enforcement—the TRUST Act’s goals may be met nonetheless if ICE 
officials protect survivors of domestic violence and shift their focus to 
serious offenders and those who pose a threat to national security. 
California is not alone in its resistance to S-Comm. Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and New York have also resisted participation in the 
program.258 While states and counties continue to explore ways to work 
around or avoid S-Comm, the federal government should implement more 
reforms to the program and ensure that ICE follows through with its recent 
changes. The next section details suggested reforms, including the ability 
for localities like Santa Clara to opt out. 
VII. S-COMM RE-ENVISIONED: REFORMS TO A POTENTIALLY 
INEVITABLE PROGRAM 
Unfortunately for many immigrants, S-Comm will be a nationwide 
reality in the very near future. Though communities should make their own 
                                                             
 
256 Id. §7282(a)(2)–(5). 
257  Press Release, Tom Ammiano, Assemblymember, California State Assembly, 
“TRUST Act 2.0” to be unveiled in January as Ammiano Urges State Officals to Step up 
Leadership (Sept. 8, 2011), http://asmdc.org/members/a13/news-room/press-
releases/item/2945-trust-act-20-to-be-unveiled-in-january-as-ammiano-urges-state-
officials-to-step-up-leadership. 
258 See Cosmetic Reforms, supra note 57. 
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adjustments to the program, S-Comm as a whole would benefit from a 
number of changes in order to make the program more cost-effective and 
less detrimental to immigrants and their families.259 HSAC’s Task Force 
recommendations include: increasing transparency and clarifying what S-
Comm is and how it works, increasing consistency among DHS’s 
immigration enforcement programs, working with state and local officials 
to “develop trust” in S-Comm, reaffirming enforcement priorities and 
ensuring that S-Comm adheres to its goals, and exercising discretion in 
enforcement.260 The recommendations below reflect some of the task 
force’s suggestions, and go further to ensure greater protection for 
immigration communities. 
First, individuals arrested for suspected acts of domestic violence should 
not be screened for S-Comm programs until they are convicted. This delay 
in sending fingerprints could spare wrongly arrested victims of domestic 
violence the additional torment of deportation. Second, S-Comm should 
screen only those individuals convicted of serious Level 1 offenses, and 
only upon conviction (rather than at the pre-conviction stage), and not Level 
2 or 3 offenders who are not a threat to public safety. Though ICE would 
not likely accept such a change or allow counties to adopt the practice, this 
change would curb the number of individuals trapped in deportation 
proceedings, reduce the cost of implementing S-Comm, and limit 
deportation to those immigrants who are serious criminals. 
DHS should rethink its stance on S-Comm’s mandatory implementation 
requirement and provide clear procedures and guidelines for options 
available to states and counties firmly opposed to S-Comm. This will enable 
those jurisdictions to comply with or decline to comply with the program in 
                                                             
 
259 The changes in this section were suggested by a nonprofit organization in the 
Southwest working tirelessly for immigrants’ rights by engaging in immigration policy 
reform and community organizing. The organization prefers to remain anonymous. 
260 See TASK FORCE, supra note 125, at 15–16. 
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ways that are both constitutional and consistent with local public policy. All 
participating jurisdictions should also be trained on illegal racial or ethnic 
profiling in an effort to avoid discriminatory police practices.261 
In order to determine the actual effects and efficacy of S-Comm, 
quarterly data collection and analysis made available to the public should 
include more than just match rates, proportions of “lower-level alien 
offenders,” and removal proportions.262 For instance, the information could 
include the number of searches localities conducted using S-Comm 
databases, and the number and level of “hits” obtained through S-Comm 
disaggregated by the number of hits where charges were not filed, where 
charges were later dismissed, or where there is no conviction, as well as the 
number of incorrect “hits.” 
Most importantly, the federal government should explicitly allow local 
governments, especially sanctuary cities, and LLEAs to opt out of S-Comm. 
By doing so, the federal government would appropriately respect local 
authorities’ judgment.263 Once a locality opts out, the FBI should not share 
fingerprints from that locality with ICE. Respecting local judgment is not 
inconsistent with DHS’s stated goals for S-Comm (e.g., deporting 
criminals) especially in regard to Level 1 offenders, who ICE will deport 
regardless. 
If these safeguards are not implemented, and if ICE’s reforms are 
ineffective, S-Comm will continue to threaten the civil liberties and safety 
of immigrants and US citizens alike, especially people of color.264 
                                                             
 
261 The Criminal Alien Program: Immigration Enforcement in Prisons and Jails, IMMIGR. 
POLICY CTR. (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/criminal-
alien-program-immigration-enforcement-prisons-and-jails. 
262 See Statistical Monitoring, supra note 123.  
263 See Aoki & Shuford, supra note 155. 
264 See ACLU Statement, supra note 3. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Through S-Comm, ICE requests that local governments participate in the 
historically federally regulated area of immigration. While it is unclear 
whether S-Comm exceeds the federal government’s power, it is clear that 
the program’s repercussions are far reaching and that many of them are 
destructive. In order to avoid some of the devastating consequences on 
LLEAs, families, employers, and state and local governments, the federal 
government must make changes to S-Comm. The government should defer 
to local governments’ judgments by allowing them to opt out of the 
program, and DHS and CRCL must ensure that their proposed changes 
actually take effect. 
 
 
